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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

the acts alleged in Puig occurred in New Jersey, that state has
primary jurisdiction over the offense. Absent a "particular effect"
in New York, this State could not properly deny New Jersey its
authority to prosecute by assuming extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The Puig holding appears to be in harmony with the legislative
intent underlying CPL section 20.20(2)(b). The only apparent purpose of the provision is to protect New York from offenses which,
although committed without the state, have the effect of corrupting
this state's governmental processes. 84 Nothing in the legislative
history supports an expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction
beyond such offenses. Under the Puig holding, therefore, out-ofstate criminal conduct cannot generally be prosecuted in New York
absent an in-state act in furtherance thereof. The constitutional
obstacles to any contrary result are simply too substantial to overcome.
CPL § 60.35: Affirmative damage requiredfor impeachment of one's own
witness.
When the legislature enacted section 60.35 of the CPL18 5 it
drastically changed the method for impeaching one's own witness
prosecution by the state after a federal conviction or acquittal was barred when the crimes
charged were too similar. In Cirillo v. Justices of the Sup. Ct., 43 App. Div. 2d 4, 349
N.Y.S.2d 129 (2d Dep't 1973), a New York prosecution for possession of heroin was
dismissed where there had been a prior federal indictment charging the defendant with an
attempt to distribute heroin. The court did, however, approve the State's indictment against
the defendant for possession of cocaine on the same date. See People v. LoCicero, 17 App.
Div. 2d 31, 230 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't 1962), modified, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 200 N.E.2d 622, 251
N.Y.S.2d 953 (1964) (state prosecution barred after federal acquittal on substantially identical charges).
In general, however, New York courts have adopted the state-federal exception to the
double jeopardy rule. See People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.2d 817, 186 N.Y.S.2d
230, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 8 (1959) (state law against wiretapping punishes different conduct
than does federal law); accord, Klein v. Murtagh, 44 App. Div. 2d 465, 355 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d
Dep't 1974); People v. Adamchesky, 184 Misc. 769, 55 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1945). In
determining whether a sister-state prosecution bars subsequent indictment in New York,
courts consider the nature of the relationship between the offenses prosecuted. See generally
7B McKINNEY's CPL § 40.20, commentary at 105 (1971). In People ex rel. Heflin v. Silberglitt, 2 App. Div. 2d 767, 153 N.Y.S.2d 279 (2d Dep't 1956), the defendant had stolen a
car in New York, driven it in Massachusetts, and was convicted there for operating a stolen
vehicle. He then returned to New York and pleaded guilty to petit larceny. Later, however,
he brought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the New York indictment, containing
counts for the taking, removing, operating, and driving of the car in New York, subjected
him to double jeopardy. The court held there was no violation of his rights because the two
indictments involved different crimes, each of which was prosecuted in the state where it had
been1 committed.
4
S See note 181 supra.

1s" Section 60.35 of the CPL provides:
1. When, upon examination by the party who called him, a witness in a criminal
proceeding gives testimony upon a material issue of the case which tends to disprove the position of such party, such party may introduce evidence that such
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in a criminal trial. Under the previous statute, if a witness' trial
testimony was inconsistent with either a prior written statement
signed by him or a prior oral statement under oath, the party
calling the witness was permitted to use such a prior statement for
impeachment purposes. l 0 Use of the witness' prior testimony for
impeachment purposes under the current statute, however, requires not only that the testimony meet the previous criteria, but
also that it be "upon a material issue of the case" and "tend to
disprove the position" of the party calling the witness. 187 Recently,
in People v. Fitzpatrick,' 8 the Court of Appeals had its first opportunity to interpret section 60.35. With three judges dissenting, the
Court construed the statute in a particularly strict and narrow
manner.
The Fitzpatrick defendant, a union official, was convicted of
perjury in the first degree for having given false testimony to a
grand jury investigating the receipt of kickbacks from employers. 18 9 In testimony before the grand jury, a key prosecution witness stated that he had cashed an incriminating check for the
defendant. When called by the People at trial, however, he testified
that he was unable to recall any of the events in question. On the
district attorney's motion, the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to
use the witness' prior grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes.' 90 The defendant appealed, maintaining that section 60.35
witness has previously made either a written statement signed by him or an oral
statement under oath contradictory to such testimony.
2. Evidence concerning a prior contradictory statement introduced pursuant to
subdivision one may be received only for the purpose of impeaching the credibility
of the witness with respect to his testimony upon the subject, and does not constitute evidence in chief. Upon receiving such evidence at ajury trial, the court must
so instruct the jury.
3. When a witness has made a prior signed or sworn statement contradictory to his
testimony in a criminal proceeding upon a material issue of the case, but his
testimony does not tend to disprove the position of the party who called him and
elicited such testimony, evidence that the witness made such prior statement is not
admissible, and such party may not use such prior statement for the purpose of
refreshing the recollection of the witness in a manner that discloses its contents to
the trier of the facts.
186CCP § 8-a.
187 CPL § 60.35. Previously, the rule was the same for both criminal and civil
cases.
Compare CCP § 8-a, with CPA § 243-a. This rule still prevails in civil cases. See CPLR 4514.
188 40 N.Y.2d 44, 351 N.E.2d 675, 386 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1976).
189
Id. at 46, 351 N.E.2d at 676, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 29. In testimony before the grand jury,
the defendant had denied receiving kickbacks "in the guise of salary checks made payable to
non-employees designated by him." Id., 351 N.E.2d at 676, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 29. At trial, the
prosecution sought to prove that the defendant, in the company of an undercover police
officer, presented such a check for payment at a tavern, received the cash, and pocketed the
same. In addition to the police officer, the prosecution called the bartender who cashed the
check.
180 The witness' grand jury testimony had, to some degree, supported the police officer's
testimony. Certain answers, however, tended to create suspicion as to whether he actually
recalled the events. For example, "[o]n being asked if he had cashed a check for Fitzpatrick
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prohibits such impeachment of one's own witness.
Judge Fuchsberg, writing for the majority,1 9' found that "CPL
60.35 manifestly permits impeachment only when the testimony of
the witness in court affirmatively damages the case of the party calling
him.' 1 92 Thus, impeachment was declared improper in Fitzpatrick
since the inability of the prosecution's witness to recall what occurred "did not contradict or disprove any testimony or other
factual evidence presented by the prosecution . . . .
The testimony merely failed to corroborate such other evidence. The majority's primary reasons for requiring that the witness' testimony
affirmatively damage the prosecution's case were the danger of
prosecutorial abuse' 94 and the difficulty, despite instructions to the
contrary, in preventing juries from considering impeachment
material as evidence-in-chief. 95 The Court also noted that the Peohe replied, 'Iprobably did.'" Id. at 47, 351 N.E.2d at 676, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 29. The
dissent pointed out that on direct examination, after testifying that he could not recall what
happened, the witness was asked if he had testified before the grand jury that Fitzpatrick
had cashed a check made out to someone else and he replied, "No, I don't think so." Id. at
56, 351 N.E.2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
It is interesting to note that the Court discussed the witness' reason for testifying as he
did at the grand jury hearing everl though such discussion was not dispositive of the issue
before it. The Court stated that the witness
had responded to the leading questions before the Grand Jury as he had because he
thought that was what the District Attorney wanted him to do, because he assumed
that there was independent proof that things had happened the way they were
presented to him in the questions, and because he had been unable to cope with
three interrogators at once.
Id. at 47, 351 N.E.2d at 676, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 29. The Court's pointed discussion of this
collateral issue may indicate its willingness to consider the continuing validity of current
prosecutorial practices at grand jury hearings given the proper case.
Also of interest is the fact that the Court noted that many commentators suggest that
admission of out-of-court statements does not create prejudice when the person who made
the statement is available for cross-examination, and thus, such statements should be admitted as evidence-in-chief. Id. at 50 n.1, 351 N.E.2d at 678 n.1, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 31 n.1. The
Court stated that such considerations were irrelevant in the instant case because it was bound
by § 60.35, "which makes the admissibility of such material turn on criteria other than its
hearsay nature."Id. Since the Court conceded the irrelevancy ofthis question, one wonders ifthe
Court is subtly asking the legislature to consider redrafting § 60.35.
191 Joining Judge Fuchsberg were Judges Cooke, Jones, and Wachtler. Judge Gabrielli
was joined in the dissent by Chief Judge Breitel and Judge Jasen.
192Id. at 51, 351 N.E.2d at 679, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 32 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted). As further support for its affirmative damage test, the Court pointed out that since
the previous rule had no such requirement, the legislature could have simply reenacted CCP
§ 8-a had it not wanted to include a damage requirement. Id. at 51-52, 351 N.E.2d at 679,
386 N.Y.S.2d at 32. For a discussion of damage requirements for impeachment of one's own
witness, see Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L. Rv. 996, 1004-09 (1963).
193
40 N.Y.2d at 52, 351 N.E.2d at 679, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 32 (emphasis in original).
94
1 Id. at 50, 351 N.E.2d at 678-79, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 31. People v. Welch, 16 App. Div. 2d
554, 229 N.Y.S.2d 909 (4th Dep't 1962). Fear of prosecutorial abuse has often been mentioned as a reason for requiring affirmative damage. See, e.g., Note, Impeaching One's Own
Witness, 49 VA. L. REv. 996, 1004-09 (1963); Note, PriorStatements of One's Own Witness to
Counteract Surprise Testimony: Hearsay and Impeachment Under the "Damage" Test, 62 YALE L.J.
650, 653-58 (1953).
195 40 N.Y.2d at 49-50, 351 N.E.2d at 678, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 31, citing People v. Freeman,

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:771

ple were not suffering from any prejudicial surprise since the
prosecutor was aware of his witness' "memory lapse" before the
96

trial.1

The dissent, however, felt there was no doubt but that impeachment of the witness was proper. Speaking for the minority,
Judge Gabrielli stated that the witness' "claimed inability to recall
the incident at trial cast doubt upon the ability of the prosecution
to prove defendant guilty and, therefore, 'tended to disprove' the
prosecution case.' 9 7 The minority also pointed out that if the
prosecution were not allowed to use the witness' prior testimony to
impeach him, the jury might well wonder why he was called to
testify at all, since he could not remember anything about the
events in question. 198 Particularly significant to the dissent was the
first draft of section 60.35, which contained the wording "intrinsically unfavorable" testimony. 9 9 The dissent felt that the subsequent substitution of the language "tends to disprove" for "intrinsically unfavorable" was indicative of a legislative intent "to broaden
the perspective of the statute and permit greater latitude ... [for]
impeachment of one's own witness."20°
Although the commentators disagree concerning what constitutes sufficient grounds for a party to impeach his own witness, 20 '
9 N.Y.2d 600, 176 N.E.2d 39, 217 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1961); People v. Ferraro, 293 N.Y. 51, 55
N.E.2d 861 (1944).
196 40 N.Y.2d at 53, 351 N.E.2d at 680, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
197
Id. at 58, 351 N.E.2d at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 36. As further support for their
position, the dissent quoted from Professor Wigmore's treatise, wherein it is stated that a
witness "is clearly false in one or the other of his statements, [where] one of them in effect
asserts he knows about the affair and the other asserts he does not." 3A J. WIGNMORE,
EVIDENCE § 904(8) (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). The minority found further support for its
position in another section of Professor Wigmore's work in which it is stated that "where the
witness now claims to be unable to recollect a matter, a former affirmation of it should be
admitted as a contradiction." Id. § 1043 (emphasis in original).
19840 N.Y.2d at 58, 351 N.E.2d at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 36. This factor is considered to
be significant in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Pickens, 190 Cal. App. 2d 138, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 795 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
The majority recognized the potential psychological damage to the prosecution's case,
but pointed out that in the instant case the prosecution was fully aware that the witness
would testify that he was unable to recall the pertinent facts, see 40 N.Y.2d at 52-53, 351
N.E.2d at 680, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 33, and could have easily avoided any such possible harm by
not calling the witness to the stand. Furthermore, if such a witness is called, he may be
handled in a manner that would minimize any damage. Id.
199 TEMPORARY COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE, PROPOSED

NEW YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 60.35, Staff Comment at 68-69
200 40 N.Y.2d at 57-58, 351 N.E.2d at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 36.

(1967).
The majority, in
contradistinction, declared the change of language to be irrelevant since Fitzpatrick involved
not a question of the degree of harm done to the prosecution case, but rather whether the
witness' testimony harmed the prosecution's case at all. Id. at 51 n.2, 351 N.E.2d at 679 n.2,
386 N.Y.S.2d at 32 n.2.
201 Compare 11A MCKINNEY'S CPL § 60.35, commentary at 252-54 (1971) and W.
RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 511 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973), with 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§
904, 1043 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
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it is submitted that the Court's interpretation of section 60.35 is the
proper one. The decision, however, does leave some unanswered
questions. The first of these involves the case where the prosecution
is genuinely surprised at trial by a witness who claims that he
cannot recall the events in question. Faced with this additional
circumstance, future courts may distinguish Fitzpatrick and allow
the district attorney to use prior statements for impeachment pur20 2
poses.
Another troublesome question is whether Fitzpatrick is applica-

ble to a defendant who wishes to impeach one of his witnesses
through the use of a prior inconsistent statement. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in Chambers v. Mississippi,20 3 held that

where a witness who has made prior exculpatory statements is
called by the defense and gives trial testimony which is merely
neutral towards the accused, the defendant may not be denied the
right to cross-examine and impeach the witness. In Chambers, the

defendant was accused and convicted of murder. A witness called
by the defense had confessed to the killing on four separate occasions. On one of these occasions he had in fact executed a sworn

statement. 0 4 Later, however, he repudiated the confessions. Subsequent to the introduction of the sworn confession into evidence

by the defense, the prosecution elicited its retraction on crossexamination. The defense then moved for permission to examine
the witness as an adverse witness. The motion was denied, and on
appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld conviction, reasoning
that the witness' testimony was not adverse because it did not

accuse the defendant of the crime charged. 20 5 The State of Mississippi maintained that ho right of confrontation existed until a

witness testified against an accused, and since the witness' testimony
did not accuse the defendant of a crime, he was not testifying
against the defendant. The Supreme Court, finding this argument
202 The difficulty inherent in such a rule is that the only way the trial court can
determine if the district attorney is genuinely surprised is to excuse the jury and examine the
witness to discover whether he had informed the prosecutor that he could not recall the
events in question. If the witness should tell the court that he had so informed the district
attorney, the court would be bound by Fitzpatrick. If the witness had not so notified the
prosecution, and if the court allowed impeachment via prior inconsistent statements, then
the problem of juror acceptance of such prior statements as evidence-in-chief would reappear. Moreover, if the witness has been suborned by the defendant, he would probably tell
the court that he had informed the district attorney.
203 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
204 The other confessions were made to three friends on different occasions. The trial
court refused to allow these people to testify on the ground of hearsay. Mississippi, although
recognizing an admission against pecuniary interest as an exception to the hearsay rule, does
not recognize
an admission against penal interest as such an exception. Id. at 310-11.
20
51d. at 291-92.
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unconvincing, stated that the "retraction inculpated... [the defendant] to the same extent that it exculpated . . ." the witness. 206 The
Court rejected the idea that the right of confrontation in a criminal
trial can be governed by such an "unrealistic definition of the word
'against.' "207
It is submitted that if the New York courts apply the "affirmative damage" rule of Fitzpatrick in a mechanical manner they may
well run afoul of the Chambers decision. Such questions, however,
will be definitively answered only in subsequent cases.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACTICE

Landowners held to single duty of reasonable care towards all entrants.
Through a series of cases decided over the course of the past
century, common law courts developed a complex system whereby
the degree of duty owed by a landowner 20 8 to a person upon his
premises varied with the classification of that person. 20 9 At common law, a trespasser was one who entered or remained upon the
premises without privilege or the consent of the owner. 2 10 To him
the occupier owed only the slight duty to refrain from inflicting
wanton or wilful injury.2 1 ' In contrast, a licensee was defined as
206

Id. at 297.
20 Id. at 298. See United States v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1975) (a party does
not "vouch" for the testimony of his witnesses); United States v. Perez, 493 F.2d 1339 (10th
Cir. 1974) (denial of right of confrontation to permit government agent to testify as to what
an informer told him without producing the informer at trial).
208 Although considerable legal differences may exist between the status of land owner
and land occupier, for the purposes of this Survey the terms are used interchangeably to
denote one in control of real property.
209See, e.g., Haefeli v. Woodrich Eng'r Co., 255 N.Y. 442, 175 N.E. 123 (1931); Vaughan
v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 118 N.E. 219 (1917); Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1
C.P. 274 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (Ex. 1867). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 351-415 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Marsh, The History and
Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV. 182 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Marsh].
210 Vaughan v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 118 N.E. 219 (1917); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965). Consent may be implied when a landowner has knowledge
that persons enter and use a particular area in substantial numbers. Such persons are then
treated as licensees. Id. § 330.
211 Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N.Y. 181, 179 N.E. 378 (1932); Marsh, supra note 209,
at 187. An early exception to the rule equated the setting of a spring-gun to trap a trespasser
with the intentional infliction of injury. Bird v. Holbrook, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (C.P. 1828).
New York courts have expanded the notion of trap to include deceptively innocent, artificially created dangerous conditions in the land. Mayer v. Temple Props., Inc., 307 N.Y.
559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954) (55-foot-deep hole covered with flimsy piece of wood). The
concept of trap also includes the negligent control of a dangerous instrumentality. Kingsland
v. Erie County Agricultural Soc'y, 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949) (fireworks). Another
early exception to the rule prohibiting recovery for injuries sustained by trespassers can be
found in Barnes v. Ward, 137 Eng. Rep. 945 (C.P. 1850), wherein the court held an
unfenced excavation on the side of a road to be a nuisance, for which the occupier would be
liable to anyone injured by it. Another exception differentiated between discovered and

